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I. INTRODUCTION

Chief Wahoo, the Cleveland Indians' perennial mascot, is seen by many in
the Native American community as a discriminatory emblem which parodies
and denigrates Native Americans and their culture.2 While other Native
American team names, emblems and mascots have been defended as
celebrating Native American bravery and heroism, the grinning idiot vestige
of Chief Wahoo with his exaggerated features is harder to justify.3 This article
traces the history of the Cleveland Indians and Chief Wahoo. It then suggests
and assesses two methods by which the Chief Wahoo emblem may be legally
challenged. The first method is to assert that Chief Wahoo, as used in Jacob's
Field, is state sponsored discrimination. As such it could be challenged as a
violation of equal protection or as racist speech. This first challenge would have
some significant hurdles. To begin with, it must be asserted that even though
the Indians are privately owned, the teams' actions in Jacob's Field may be
deemed state actions. Next, it would have to be shown that there was sufficient
discriminatory intent behind the creation of Chief Wahoo such that the emblem
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Alternatively, in addition to
proving that the teams' actions should be deemed state actions, a new theory
asserting that discriminatory state speech is a violation of the First Amendment
could be advanced.
Another method by which the Chief Wahoo emblem may be legally
challenged is by asserting it is a disparaging trademark and therefore invalidly
registered. Trademark registration is governed by the Lanham Act which

2For a further discussion of how artwork may express national discrimination and
an effort to alienate a nationality and culture, see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Art &
Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (1998) (arguing that based on a recommended international cultural
forfeiture standard Nazi cultural depravity justified Russia's appropriation of German
national artwork seized at the end of World War II).
3In addition to the Cleveland Indians, a small sampling of teams that use Indian
names include: the Washington Redskins, the Atlanta Braves, the Kansas City Chiefs,
and the Florida State University Seminoles. Some teams have stopped using Indian
names after receiving complaints that such names were offensive. In 1972, Stanford
University changed its name from the Indians to the Cardinal, and the University of
Massachusetts changed its mascot from the Indian to the Minuteman. David Arnold,
Minutemen Comes Under '90s-Style Fire, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1993, at 1; Karen
Goldberg, Ethnic Team Names Draw New Attacks, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at Dl. In
1974, Dartmouth also stopped using "Indians" as a team name. See MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT ON THE USE
OF NICKNAMES, LOGOS, AND MASCOTS DEPICTING NATIVE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN MICHIGAN
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS (1988). In 1994, St. Johns decided to change its teams' name
from the "Redmen" to the "Red Storm." St. Johns had already removed its logo depicting
an Indian brave in 1991. Despite the Indian logo, the school claimed the name "Redmen"
emanated from the red jerseys the team used to wear, and not from a Native American
derivation. Michael Shain, Launder St. Johns' Tradition "Redmen" may be Ousted,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1993, at 172. In addition, the Boards of Education of Wisconsin and
Minnesota almost banned all Indian mascots in public schools. Keith Ervin, Debate on
Dropping School Mascots, SEATILE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at Bl.
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prohibits the registration of scandalous or disparaging marks. In order to
successfully assert that the Chief Wahoo emblem should not enjoy federal
trademark registration protection, it must be shown that the mark is either
scandalous or disparaging as the courts have interpreted such terms under
section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act. A bell weather of the strength of such a
challenge is a case currently before the Patent and Trademark Office
(hereinafter PTO) challenging the trademark of the Redskins, the National
Football League (hereinafter NFL) team that plays in Washington, D.C. While
the Redskins suit has not yet been resolved, the implications of such challenge
may be instructive as to the success of challenging Chief Wahoo's registration
rights.
While many see the Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo emblem as innocuous,
a great many others see the mark as blatantly offensive. Given the number of
people who find the Chief Wahoo mark offensive, hopefully the Cleveland
Indians will change the mark themselves. If not, the action contemplated in this
article might provide valid grounds for legal challenge.
II. THE CLEVELAND INDIANS

A. History of the Cleveland Indians
The Cleveland Indians were one of the four charter members of the American
League.4 The team started as the Forest Citys in 1869.5 In 1889, the name was
changed to the Spiders because there were a number of tall, thin players.6 In
1900, the name changed to the Blues, because of the team's striking blue
uniforms? Looking for a more forceful name, the team became the Broncos in
1902.8 In 1903 the name was changed to the Naps in honor of a player named
Napolean Lajoie.9 Finally, in 1914, in honor of Louis Sockalexis, Cleveland's
professional baseball team became known as the Indians, the name it enjoys
today.IO
Louis Sockalexis was a Penobscot Indian from Old Town, Maine and the first
Native American to play major league baseball.ll His career was short lived as

4Cfeveland Indians Web Page (visited June 17, 1998) <http:/ /www.indians.com/
history I index.html>.
5Id.
6Id.
7Id.
Bid.

9Cfeveland Indians Web Page (visited June 17, 1998) <http:/ /www.indians.com/
history I index.html>.
10Id.
llid.
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Sockalexis only played three seasons.l2 In 1914, a Cleveland newspaper held a
contest to rename Cleveland's baseball team.l3 The winning entry was the
"Indians." The fan who sent in the entry said the name was in honor of
Sockalexis.l4 However, some Native Americans believe that Native American
team names and mascots, such as Cleveland's, are used not to honor Native
American bravery but to portray Native Americans as a spectacle to be
ridiculed.l5 They note that Louis Sockalexis was frequently insulted in
newspapers and subjected to war whoops and other racist slurs by fans.16 They
assert that Sockalexis was not a hailed sports hero, but the victim of intense
discrimination and bigotry, which contributed to his alcoholism and early
retirement.17 Therefore, Native American team names and mascots can be
viewed as a source of parody and satire and as a preservation of stereotypes as
opposed to a celebration of positive attributes.

B. History of Chief Wahoo
The Chief Wahoo mascot was created by Walter Golbach, a 17-year-old artist,
for the owner of the Indians in 1948.18 Goldbach gave the chief an orange tinged
face, a prominent nose, and huge teeth.19 Goldbach, however, has said he never
intended to offend anyone with his work.20 Since Goldbach's version, the Chief
Wahoo image has undergone at least five transformations.21 Dr. Robert Bane
of John Carroll University has analyzed the Chief Wahoo image and found that
the feather on Chief Wahoo's head is a denigration of a sacred symbol, and the
grinning buck teeth and hook nose to be caricatures of real people.22 This
corroborates the idea that Native American mascots are used not to honor

l2Jd.
l3Jd.

14C/eveland Indians Web Page (visited June 17, 1998) <http:/ /www.indians.com/
history /index.html>.

15Chief Wahoo is Likely on Extinction Path, THE VICTORIA SUN PRESS ENTERPRISE, Oct.
21, 1997, at COl.
16COMMITTEE OF 500 YEARS OF DIGNITY AND REsiSTANCE, RACISM & CLEVELAND
BASEBALL (Cleveland, Ohio 1997).
l7Jd.

18Eric Sandstorm, History Smiles on the Many Faces of Chief Wahoo, BEACON JouRNAL
EXTRA, July 26, 1995.
l9Jd.
20Jd.

21Jd.
22Gary Axlerod, Controversy Over Chief Wahoo Continues, BLACK & GoLD (last
modified Jan. 25, 1996) <http:/ /tiger.chuh.cleveland-heights.k12.oh.us/Black
Gold/ 81-04/ controversy-over-chief-w .html>.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/3

4

1998]

THE INDIANS' CHIEF PROBLEM

215

Native American bravery but to portray Native Americans as a spectacle to be
ridiculed.23
Native American groups have found Chief Wahoo so offensive that during
the 1997 World Series a group of Native Americans burned an effigy of Chief
Wahoo in protest.24 On April 9, 1998, Chief Wahoo was again burned in effigy,
this time resulting in five people being arrested outside the Indians' stadium,
Jacobs Field.25
Other groups have not been blind to the insult Native Americans feel the
Chief Wahoo emblem represents. Recently the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility, a network of 275 Protestant, Catholic and Jewish institutional
investors with an estimated $70 billion in combined assets, asked companies it
invests in to stop licensing the Chief Wahoo mark because it believes such use
is a corporate endorsement of the denigration of Native Americans.26
Meanwhile, the team has stated that "The Cleveland Indians organization is
very aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue. We have gone to great
lengths to respect those sensitivities. In no way do we intend to demean any
group, especially one as proud as Native Americans."27While Native American
groups have complained that the cartoon Chief Wahoo emblem is a denigrating
caricature of Native Americans, the team believes the mascot is not offensive
because it is not an image of an actual human.28
Ill. CHIEF WAHOO AS STATE SPONSORED DISCRIMINATION

A. Chief Wahoo as State Action

A challenge to the Chief Wahoo mark might viably argue that the Cleveland
Indians' use of the mark constitutes discriminatory state action. First, such a
challenge would need to show that the actions of the Cleveland Indians can be
equated with, or attributed to, government action. Although the Cleveland
Indians are a private entity, the team's actions in Jacobs Field could possibly be
equated with, or attributed to, government action under the Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority29 symbiotic relationship test. As the Supreme

23Chief Wahoo is Likely on Extinction Path, THE VICTORIA SUN PRESS ENTERPRISE, Oct.
21, 1997, at COl.
24 Wally Guenther, Five in Chief Wahoo Protest Freed From jail, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr.
12, 1998, 2B.

25[d.
26ChiefWahoo Canned Monet; Talks Louder Than History, SYRACUSE HERALD-JOURNAL,
July 14, 1997, at A8, available in 1997 WL 5752127.
27 Gary Axlerod, Controversy Over Chief Wahoo Continues, BLACK & GOLD (last
modified Jan. 25, 1996) <http:/ /tiger.chuh.cleveland-heights.k12.oh.us/Black
Gold/ 81-04/ controversy-over-chief-w .html>.
28Jd.
29365

u.s. 715 (1961).
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Court has noted, "[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character
as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action."30 Arguably, the City of Cleveland's sponsorship and endorsement of
the Cleveland Indians has made the team so entwined with governmental
policies, or so impregnated with a governmental character, that the team is
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon government action.
There are two approaches that the Supreme Court has outlined for
determining whether a defendant's conduct represents state action: the "public
function approach"31 and the "nexus approach."32 A challenge to Chief Wahoo
as a state endorsed emblem would probably have a greater likelihood of
success under the nexus approach. Under the nexus approach, private conduct
comes under constitutional scrutiny when it is intertwined with the
government.33 The nexus approach's "symbiotic relationship test" was
developed by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.34
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, a parking garage was owned and
operated by a state agency.35 The state leased some commercial space in the
garage to a private restaurant operator who refused to serve the plaintiff
because he was black.36 The plaintiff brought suit under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The United States Supreme Court
found the requisite state action present and held that the restaurant's actions
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.38 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that the relationship between the restaurant and the parking facility
conferred mutual benefits.39 As a result of this symbiotic relationship, the
Supreme Court held that the restaurant operator was a state actor.40 The Court
stated:
By its inaction, ... the State has not only made itself a party to the
refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far

30Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).

31See

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTIUTIONAL LAW,§

18-1 at 1690 (2d ed.

1988).
32Jd.

33See Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.
34Jd.
35Jd. at 716.
36Jd.
37Jd.

38Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
39 Id. at 724.
40Jd. at 725.
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insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with (the private
party] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so
' pure 1y pnva
. t e ' .... 41
The Supreme Court subsequently refined and supplemented the state action
doctrine in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,42 describing a two part approach for
determining when a plaintiff may attribute the actions of a private party to the
state.43 First, the deprivation of a constitutional right must occur under color
of state law or via a privilege created by the state.44 Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a state actor.45 A plaintiff may satisfy part two by
using previously articulated state action tests, such as the Burton nexus test.46
Therefore, Lugar only added another requirement to the state action test; it did
not overrule previous tests.47 Furthermore, recent Supreme Court decisions
imply that the Court no longer supports the analysis set forth in Lugar, and
therefore will simply use the pre- Lugar state action tests.48
Based on the Burton nexus test, it could be argued that the Cleveland Indians'
use of an emblem or mascot in Jacobs Field is subject to constitutional review.
A court might find that the requisite state action exists when the Cleveland
Indians use, display and promote the Chief Wahoo visage in Jacobs Field. The
symbiotic relationship between the Cleveland Indians and the government of
the City of Cleveland might very well satisfy the nexus test. A challenge to the
Chief Wahoo emblem could satisfy the state action requirement under the
Burton test by demonstrating sufficient government involvement in the
conduct of the Cleveland Indians and in the operation of Jacobs Field. Such
sufficient government involvement could be shown by demonstrating that the
City of Cleveland, by its action, or even inaction, has elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the Cleveland Indians, and thereby behind the
team's use of the Chief Wahoo emblem.
It is possible that a court could find that the City of Cleveland "[h]as so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private party] that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which,
41Jd.

42457 u.s. 922 (1982).
43Jd. at 937.
44Jd.
45Jd.
46Jd. at 939.

47Mitchell L. Beckloff, Note, State Action in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee: Let the Games Begin, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 635 (1989).
48Jd. at663;seeWestv. Atkins,487U.S.42 (1988) (holdingthata doctor under contract
with the state to provide medical care in a prison was a state actor); see also San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that
the United States Olympic Committee was not a state actor).
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on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' .... "49
That is, a symbiotic relationship arguably exists between a privately owned
sports franchise and the city in which it plays its games sufficient to satisfy the
nexus test.
Certainly a symbiotic relationship exists to some degree between a privately
owned sports team and its host city. so After all, a city and its baseball team reap
considerable benefits from each other. A professional sports franchise usually
receives the use of modem facilities, including a stadium, parking areas and
luxury seating boxes, as well as tax incentives and a discharge from stadium
maintenance responsibilities.51 In addition, the team secures the use of the
city's name, which enhances the team's image and its ability to attract fans and
corporate sponsors.52 In tum, the city obtains marquee exposure, a source of
entertainment, a source of civic pride, and an enterprise that can draw fans as
well as businesses that compliment such a stadium. The city benefits from the
media attention and tourism that a team can draw.53 The local economy
expands through the sale of souvenirs and bookings in hotels to accommodate
the visiting team, press and fans. 54 Also, teams bring cities revenues from the
use of highways, subways, buses and commuter rails.55

49Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
50 For example, upon the return of the Raiders to the City of Oakland in March, 1990,
a public official of Oakland described the relationship of the team and the city as a
"unique partnership." Leonard Koppett, In Bay Area, Not All Is ]oy in Raiders' Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1990, at D28; see also Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof'l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,20102 (1922), in which the plaintiff argued "[e]ach team of
each club in the league carries with it, and it is essential to the profit of the enterprise
that it should carry with it, its representative character; it symbolizes the great city that
it represents to those assembled to witness the contest."
51 See Koppett, supra note 50, at D28; Roberts, It's Extra Innings for the Yankees and New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1988, at B1; see also Lease on Stadium Approved for Colts By
Indianapolis, N.Y. TIMES, April1, 1984, at 3.
52 For example, in City of San Francisco v. National Exhibition Co., No. 700534, slip
op. (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 12, 1976 ), the plaintiff, in its complaint to enjoin the San Francisco
Giants baseball team from breaking its lease with the city for the use of Candlestick Park
Stadium and relocating to Toronto, noted that the lease required "[a]ll such Major
League Baseball games shall be exhibited by the Tenant under the name and style 'San
Francisco Giants' (which name it is agreed possesses commercial value as goodwill and
has a peculiar value to the Landlord), or under such other name as may be approved
by the Landlord .... " ld. at 3.
53 Andrew H. Malcolm, The Colts Move: For Indianapolis it's a Boon But in Baltimore, it
Leaves a Void in the Hearts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1984, at A22; Los Angeles Gets Big League
Glow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1957, at 67.
54 See, e.g., City of San Francisco, No. 700534, slip op. at 67; Koppett, supra note 52, at
D28; Litsky, supra note 51, at 3.
55 See, e.g., Subways to Lose By Teams' Moves, N.Y. llMES, Oct. 9,1957, at 37;seealso CihJ
of San Francisco, No. 700534, slip op. at 67. In its complaint the plaintiff stated:
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Indeed, the symbiotic relationship between a city and its baseball team has
already been found to constitute state action where the relationship between
the city and its team was similar to the relationship between the City of
Cleveland and the Cleveland Indians. In Ludtke v. Kuhn,56 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York used the nexus approach
to find that New York City's involvement with the New York Yankees and
Yankee Stadium, and the city's lease arrangement with the Yankees,
transformed Major League Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's policy of
excluding female reporters from the team's locker room into state action subject
to review under the Fourteenth Amendment.57 The court, relying heavily on
Burton, held that a symbiotic relationship existed between New York City and
the Yankees due to the extensive use of public funds in the renovation and
maintenance of Yankee Stadium.58
The court further noted that the Yankees had to obey all federal, state and
local laws affecting operations at Yankee Stadium, and that New York City had
the right to enforce and assure compliance not only with local but also state
and federallaws.59 Therefore, the Ludtke court concluded that the City's failure
to step in and stop the Yankees' discriminatory conduct was sufficient to
support a finding of state action.60
This reasoning in Ludtke should equally apply to support a finding of a
symbiotic relationship between the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland
Indians, and likewise equate the Cleveland Indians' actions in Jacobs Field with
state actions. Like Yankee stadium, Jacobs Field was built through taxes for the
benefit of Cleveland residents, and the City of Cleveland in effect owns and

[The city] will suffer substantial and irreparable harm if the defendants
are not restrained from transferring the franchise in breach of the agreement. Not only will there be a loss of revenue by reason of the payments
called for under the agreement for the use of the Stadium by the Giants
and the revenue from the parking while spectators attend games, but,
in addition, the plaintiff will suffer immeasurable damages in terms of
the loss to its citizens of the opportunity to witness major league baseball
in San Francisco, loss of revenue from tourists and professional teams
visiting the community to attend major league baseball games with
the associated loss to the local restaurants, hotels, motels, taxicabs
and various other consumeroriented establishments, resulting in a
direct reduction in tax revenue to the City itself.
Id.; see also State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Wis. 1966) (Heffernan,
Hallows & Beilfuss, JJ., dissenting). "It is not contradicted that as a result of the Braves'
presence in Wisconsin, transportation facilities were expanded, municipal services were
augmented, and industries of various types were created or expanded to support
organized baseball in Milwaukee." Id.
56461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
57Jd. at 96.
58Jd. at 9394.
59Jd. at 92.

60Jd. at 94.
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operates the stadium.61 The ballpark was built in 1994 at a cost of $180 million
and was financed through heavy public subsidies.62 The Indians lease Jacobs
Field from Gateway Corporation ("Gateway"), a nonprofit organization formed
by the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County to oversee the ballpark.63 The
Indians pay an annual rent which is tied to stadium attendance.64 As of 1998,
the team had payed $4.6 million.65 Gateway also earns one-third of the revenue
from scoreboard advertisement sales if such amount exceeds $1.5 million per
year.66 In 1998, this brought Gateway over $400,000.67 In addition, it has been
recognized that Jacobs Field has helped anchor the south side of downtown
Cleveland and helped transform it into a magnate.68 Therefore, the criteria
present in Ludtke that make actions by the Yankees equivalent to state actions
are also present in the relationship between the City of Cleveland and the
Cleveland Indians.
While the Ludtke court found that a symbiotic relationship existed between
a city and its baseball team, it must be noted that there is Ohio precedent to the
contrary. In City of Cleveland v. Bregar,69 the court found that the property owned
by Gateway, a Cleveland nonprofit corporation formed to operate Cleveland's
sports complex, was private property for purposes of First Amendment
analysis, and therefore upheld the conviction of criminal trespass against an
individual protesting greed in professional sports. The court explicitly rejected
the argument that Gateway should be considered a government actor?O In
Northeast Ohio Chapter of Associated Builders & Contrs., Inc. v. Gateway Elec. Dev.
Corp. ofGreaterCleveland,71 the court likewise found that Gateway was a private
entity for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and application of alleged
federal law violations. While the Bregar and Northeast Ohio Chapter cases are
certainly harmful, however, the challenge suggested herein would be brought
against the Cleveland Indians, not Gateway. Arguably, a baseball team which

61 James Ewinger, Judge Clears Chief Wahoo Protesters, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 8, 1998,
at lB.
62Bill Lubinger, Cleveland's New Ballpark a Financial Home Run, AusTIN AMERlCANSTATESMAN, Apr. 19, 1998, at Jl.
63Jd.

64Jd.
65Jd.
66Jd.
67Bill Lubinger, Cleveland's New Ballpark a Financial Home Run, AusTIN
AMERlCAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 19, 1998, at Jl.
68[d.
69City of Cleveland v. Bregar, 667 N.E.2d 42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
70Jd.
71No. 1:92 CV 0649, 1992 WL 119375, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 12, 1992).
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is in the public limelight is more representative of a city than is an uncelebrated
nonprofit corporation formed to run a city's stadium.
Since Ludtke provides that there may be sufficient symbiosis between the City
of Cleveland and the Cleveland Indians to satisfy the Burton nexus test, the
Cleveland Indians' use, display, and promotion of the Chief Wahoo emblem in
Jacobs Field may constitute state action. It therefore may be argued that the
City of Cleveland endorses the Chief Wahoo emblem and thereby is guilty of
government discrimination which is prohibited by the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and a novel theory of the First Amendment's
protection of speech.

B. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."72 In Washington v. Davis, however, the Supreme Court ruled that
establishing an equal protection violation requires a showing of discriminatory
intent; evidence of discriminatory impact alone does not suffice?3 The Court
reaffirmed this holding in Hunter v. Underwood,74 when it stated that "official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact .... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."75
The Supreme Court has provided guidelines by which courts can analyze
discriminatory intent claims. A plaintiff challenging government policy under
the Equal Protection Clause bears the burden of demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that racial discrimination was a substantial or
motivating factor in the adoption of the policy?6 Since determining the
"motivation behind official action is often a problematic undertaking,"77 courts
often look to the context in which actions were taken in order to evaluate the
discriminatory intent claim. "[D]etermining whether invidious discriminatory

72U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
73426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Although Washington v. Davis was a Fifth Amendment
case, the analysis is identical for the Equal Protection Clauses under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
74471

u.s. 222 (1985).

75[d. at 227-28 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65). In Hunter, two Alabama citizens, one black and one white,
were barred from county voting rolls pursuant to the Alabama Constitution, which
provided for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes involving "moral
turpitude." 471 U.S. at 223. Each of the disenfranchised voters had been convicted of
presenting a worthless check. The Supreme Court unanimously held the statute
unconstitutional, on the grounds that the law disproportionately hurt blacks and was
enacted with discriminatory intent.Id.
76Jd. at 228.
77Id.
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purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."78 If there is
the possibility of discriminatory intent, whether the government also had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its deCision must also be examined.
To defeat a Fourteenth Amendment challenge where there is the possibility of
discrimination, the government must "demonstrate that the law would have
been enacted without this [racially discriminatory] factor."79
C. Chief Wahoo as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
It may be argued that the selection of a symbol for use in the classic American
pastime that is denigrating to a minority of the population is a violation of that
minority's Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from laws which treat it
unequally. Chief Wahoo, an emblem which arguably parodies and denigrates
Native Americans, is pervasively used at Cleveland Indians games, on
Cleveland Indian paraphernalia, and throughout Major League Baseball
("MLB"). The selection of an exclusionary symbol is potentially harmful
because of the effect it may have on the desire and ability of the excluded to
participate in mainstream society. SO Additionally, the choice of a discriminatory
symbol stigmatizes those parodied individuals. The knowledge that
mainstream society, as reflected by a professional multi-hundred million dollar
state sponsored enterprise has knowingly and willfully chosen an exclusionary,
denigrating symbol has a damaging effect. The injury produced by
discriminatory state action is more than the denial of a certain benefit; it is also
"the thought and message of inferiority, of hatred and contempt, that is
communicated by the discriminatory act and that afflicts the human spirit of
the victim."81
It may be argued that Chief Wahoo symbolizes Cleveland's endorsement of
discrimination by private parties. The Supreme Court has prohibited such
government approval of private discrimination. In Reitman v. Mulkey,82 the
Court held that California could not repeal its prohibition of housing
discrimination by enacting a constitutional amendment prohibiting state
interference with land transfers between private parties. The United States
Supreme Court reasoned that the constitutional amendment would

78Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.

79 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228.
80For a further discussion of how artwork may express national discrimination and
an effort to alienate a nationality and culture, see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Art &

Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J., 699 (1998) (arguing that based on a recommended international cultural
forfeiture standard Nazi cultural depravity justified Russia's appropriation of German
national artwork seized at the end of World War II).

81 Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 980
(1990).
82387

u.s. 369 (1967).
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"significantly encourage ... private discrimination" and therefore violated the
Equal Protection Clause.83
As noted above, to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
challenger must show that racial discrimination was a substantial or
motivating factor in the adoption of the challenged policy or action, and such
motivation may be determined by assessing whatever circumstantial and
direct evidence is available.84 There seems to be little evidence available to
suggest that the Cleveland Indians' adoption of the Chief Wahoo mascot was
motivated by discriminatory intent. Challengers to the Chief Wahoo mascot
may assert, however, that the mark is so blatantly and facially offensive to
Native Americans that there must have implicitly been a racially
discriminatory intent to the creation of the mark. It can be further argued that
the mark was adopted and enjoyed popularity because it implicitly provides
an opportunity to denigrate and ridicule a minority.
If implicit discrimination motivated the adoption of the Chief Wahoo
emblem, and if the symbiotic relationship and government funding of the
Cleveland Indians' actions at Jacob's Field are considered state actions, the
Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo mascot may be seen as a violation of equal
protection. Chief Wahoo is arguably an emblem whose creation was inspired
by (perhaps unconsciously) bigotry and racism. Furthermore, by continuing
the use of Chief Wahoo, the Cleveland Indians and the City of Cleveland have
excluded and stigmatized their Native American citizens and Native
Americans in general.

D. Chief Wahoo as Racist Speech
It has been suggested that First Amendment protection should be broadened
to prohibit state endorsed hate speech.85 Under this theory, it may be argued
that Chief Wahoo violates the First Amendment by chilling the desire and
ability of Native Americans to exercise fully their First Amendment rights.
Central to this argument is the understanding that the racist speech at issue
here takes a particularly objectionable form: as argued above, it is racist
government endorsed speech. The fact that the government endorses the
speaker both increases the extent of the harm that the speech produces and
allows for a remedy plainly consistent with the First Amendment.

83Jd. at 381. In his concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that California's policy "is a
form of sophisticated discrimination whereby the people of California harness the
energies of private groups to do indirectly what they cannot under our decisions allow
their government to do." ld. at 383.

84471 U.S. at 228.
85James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag From Southern
State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505 (1991).
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1. Theory of First Amendment Prohibiting Government Endorsed
Racist Speech
It has been argued that the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment,
should be read in the context of the fight to overcome discrimination against
minorities.86 Traditionally, group defamation and racial harassment cases have
produced a tension between constitutional values. On one side, it is argued that
racist speech is a form of hate speech that impinges on the rights to free speech
and equality. On the other side, it is argued that the First Amendment protects
the right to engage in racist speech.87 This tension, however, does not exist
when the government is the speaker, for the First Amendment protects an
individual's right to speak, not the government's.
As James Madison said, "If we advert to the nature of Republican
Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the
Government, and not in the Government over the people."88 Justice Stewart
agreed when he wrote, "The First Amendment protects the press from
governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
Government."89 The common understanding of the First Amendment as a limit
on government, rather than a license for it to speak, is natural given the
language of the amendment: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."90 To
transform a restriction on government into a positive right vested in the state
would twist the Amendment's language.91
The past twenty years have seen a growing number of scholars arguing that
the First Amendment also limits the government's ability to speak. "[S]trange
as it must sound in appraising an amendment which explicitly forbids
abridging the freedom of speech, it is nonetheless arguable that the function of
that amendment implicitly requires some silencing of the government itsel£."92
While the Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the problem presented

86See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE

L.J. 1131, 1201-02

(1991).

87See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Doe
v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E. D. Mich. 1989).
884 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (quoted in Forman, supra note 85, at 518).
89CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
90U.S. CONST. amend I. The limitation on Congress is also a limitation on the states.
The Court held in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) that the First Amendment
applied via the Fourteenth Amendment to state governments.
91Forman, supra note 85.

92Jd. at 520 (quoting William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression
of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 530, 535 (1966)).
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by discriminatory government speech, the Court has recognized that "it is a
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral
in the marketplace of ideas."93
The core values of the First Amendment are particularly threatened by
government speech that encourages discrimination against, and subordination
of, disadvantaged social groups. "[T]olerance of hate speech is not tolerance
borne by the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those
least able to pay."94 Such speech serves no legitimate government function and,
indeed, may inhibit a portion of the citizenry from fully participating in the
process of governing.95 Discriminatory speech by the government directly
undermines both the commitment to autonomous expression and democratic
self-governance by intimidating certain social groups into refraining from
expression, thereby vitiating their autonomous expression rights and
impoverishing public discourse.96 In addition, racist government speech
violates the First Amendment precisely because such speech makes it that
much more difficult for those who oppose government policy to give voice to
their opposition. Accordingly, a theory of government speech that would
prohibit such discriminatory speech by the government has previously been
suggested.97
2. The Theory as Applied to Chief Wahoo
It may be argued that the City of Cleveland's decision to endorse and support
the Cleveland Indians and its Chief Wahoo emblem, arguably a symbol
denigrating Native Americans has excluded and stigmatized Native
Americans and thereby chilled their ability to speak freely and openly. As a
result of offensive mascots such as Chief Wahoo, Native Americans feel that
they experience discrimination and are ignored when they attempt to call
attention to greater social problems including poverty, alcoholism, and
suicide.98 Native American mascots that belittle culture and traditions chal-

93 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 u.s. 726, 745-46 (1978)).
94Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, at 2323 (1989).

95Forman, supra note 85, at 524-25.
96As the Court recognizedinNAACPv. Button,371 U.S. 415,435-36 (1963), the force,
and the potential discriminatory implications, of a particular government policy cannot
be comprehended without examining its relationship to other government policies. In
the case of the Chief Wahoo emblem, the arguably discriminatory government speech
achieves its silencing power from the understanding on the part of victims that
mainstream society endorses the alienation of the targeted group.
97Forman, supra note 85 at 522.
98Daniel J. Trainor, Native American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile
Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 971,971-72 (1995).
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lenge Native American self-esteem and pride in their cultural identities.99 As
a result of this stigmatization, it may be argued that the opportunity for Native
Americans, already a small minority of the American populace, to speak freely
and openly, is chilled.
E. Similar Prior Challenge Failed

Clearly, a challenge to the Chief Wahoo emblem as a state sponsored
violation of equal protection, or as a state sponsored violation of free speech,
faces significant hurdles. Indeed, while such a challenge may be viable, it
should be noted that a challenge to a discriminatory symbol raised on similar
grounds has already failed. Such challenges were raised in objection to
Alabama's use of the Confederate flag in NAACP v. Hunt.lOO While the
challenged action in Hunt was clearly state action, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's ("NAACP")
claim that the Constitution of the United States and federal statutes mandate
the removal of the flag from the Alabama state capitol.lOl The court held that
"[t]here is no unequal application of the state policy; all citizens are exposed to
the flag. Citizens of all races are offended by its position."102 The court likewise
rejected a First Amendment challenge similar to the one discussed above.103
The court found no judicially cognizable chilling effect, noting that even if
government speech causes "discomfort," if there "is no statute or ordinance,
federal or state, absolutely prohibiting" blacks from exercising a protected First
Amendment right, no First Amendment violation has occurred.104 While Ohio
is not in the Eleventh Circuit, if the reasoning of the Hunt case is applied by a
court hearing a challenge to the use of Chief Wahoo, such challenge would
likely be rejected. As in Hunt, there is no unequal application of the state policy
because all citizens are exposed to the Chief Wahoo emblem, and arguably
citizens of all heritages are offended by it. Furthermore, since there is no actual
statute or ordinance absolutely prohibiting Native Americans from exercising
a protected First Amendment right, under the Hunt court's reasoning, no First
Amendment violation has occurred.
IV. CHALLENGING THE CHIEF WAHOO TRADEMARK

While the viability of a challenge to the use of the Chief Wahoo mark as state
sponsored discrimination faces substantial hurdles, the viability of a challenge
to the federal registration of the Chief Wahoo trademark has a fair chance of

99 ld. at 975.
100891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
at 1555. A number of other parties joined the NAACP in this suit.
102Jd. at 1562.

101Jd.

l03forman, supra note 85, at 505.
104Hunt, 891

F.2d at 1565.
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success. A trademark may not be federally registered under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)
if it is disparaging or scandalous. There is valid precedent to sustain an
argument that the Chief Wahoo trademark is both disparaging and scandalous
as applied to Native Americans. If such a legal challenge to the validity of the
federal Chief Wahoo trademark registration was successful, it could seriously
undermine the value of the mark. This is because if Chief Wahoo is struck from
the federal trademark registry the mark might very well lose common law
protection too. In De Nobili v. Scanda, the court held that if a mark is not entitled
to federal registration because it does not pass content-based registration bars,
the mark cannot receive protection at common law.105 Therefore, while the
Cleveland Indians would still be able to use the Chief Wahoo mark even if
registration is canceled and it loses common law protection, under De Nobili,
so will everyone else. Anyone could produce and sell products with the Chief
Wahoo mark, which would deprive the Cleveland Indians of a substantial
amount of revenue. In order to have the exclusive right to market goods with
the Cleveland Indians' mascot, the team would have to choose a new mascot.
Furthermore, the loss of trademark registration would create bad publicity as
confirmation that the team had been using a disparaging and offensive mark.
A successful challenge to the trademark registration of the Chief Wahoo mark
could thereby induce the Cleveland Indians to abandon the mark in favor of
one that could be registered and from which thereby they could derive greater
benefit.
A. Trademark Protection

Trademarks can be protected by common law, state registration and federal
registration. Common law protection arises from the simple adoption and use
of an identifying mark, even absent any form of registration, and creates an
enforceable right of exclusivity in the mark's geographic area of use.106 In 1946,
Congress passed the Lanham Act, which provides for a federal registration
system to protect trademarks used in commerce.l07 The term "trademark"
includes any "word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof" used
by an individual to identify and distinguish his goods, or indicate a specific
source of such goods, even if the source is unknown.108
Trademark registration is governed by the Patent and Trademark Office. The
PTO is a non-commercial federal entity and one of the fourteen bureaus in the

105De Nobili v. Scanda, 198 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa.1912) (public policy prevents mark
which could not be registered from receiving common law protection).
106Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Avakoff v. Southern Pac.
Co., 765 F.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
10715 u.s.c. § 1127 (1994).
108Jd.
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Department of Commerce ("DOC:").l09 The specific role of the PTO in the
trademark context is to examine trademarks for potential registration on the
Principal Register. The PTO, however, does not determine rights of use of
trademarks. no The Principal Register provides numerous forms of protection
to registrants and provides the mark's owner with significant benefits not
granted by common law.111 Registration on the Principal Register gives
constructive notice to all later users of the trademark or of similar trademarks,
which overcomes claims of good faith use.112 Such constructive notice
abrogates the existence of any geographical limitation on the knowledge and
validity of the trademark.ll3 The registrant thereby obtains certain forms of
trademark protection even in geographically distant areas in which the
registrant is not using the mark,l14 Registration on the Principal Register is also
accompanied by certain statutory rights, such as a degree of incontestability by
others,llS including prima facie evidence of the ownership and validity of such
trademark.116 In addition, federal registration provides trademark owners
with access to federal courts to litigate issues related to the mark.l17 The PTO
will register a trademark based on a successful owner application.118

B. "Disparaging" and "Scandalous"
The ban on registration of "immoral" and "scandalous" marks first appeared
as part of the 1905 federal trademark statute which preceded the Lanham Act,
109Section 1511 states that the PTO is under the jurisdiction and supervision of the
Department of Commerce.
110Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminum v. Hunter Engineering Co., Inc., 655
F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1981).
lllSuch protections apply to service marks and collective marks as well. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1053, 1054, 1127.
11215 U .S.C. § 1072; AR1HUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
P ATEN1S, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NU1SHELL 153-54 (1990).

113See Miller, supra note 112, at 153.

114Jd.
11515 U.S. C. § 1065; Miller, supra note 112, at 153. Because the PTO is only concerned
with registration issues, the PTO's analysis will generally only focus on issues of
registration, and will generally only compare the information it has immediately before
it. This analysis is different from the more extensive marketplace oriented analysis
undertaken by the courts. See Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, KOA is A. O.K.: The Second

Circuit's Recent Kosher Trademark Decision Further Illustrates That the Patent and Trademark
Office Must Answer to a Higher Authority, COLUMBIA-VLA J.L. & AR1S, Vol. 22, No.2
(Winter 1998) (arguing that PTO decisions should not have res judicata affect because,
as recent case law demonstrates, PTO determinations sometimes lack a thorough
marketplace analysis).
11615 u.s.c. § 1057(b) (1994).
117§ 1121.
118§ 1051.
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and it is now incorporated into the Lanham Act at 15 U.S. C.§ 1052(a).119 The
major theories underlying section 2(a) of the Lanham Act and the prohibition
on inappropriate trademarks are that the government should not waste its
resources on protecting unseemly marks, and that the government should not
provide its imprimatur to unseemly marks.l20 While section 2(a) bars only the
registration of scandalous, disparaging, or immoral marks, and not the use
thereof, it does deny the statutory protection and benefits that would otherwise
result from registration. Article 15 of the United States Code section 1052(a)
states that a mark is to be refused registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or
falsely suggest a connection with persons living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute."
1. Standard and Case Law for "Disparaging"
In order to prevail in a challenge to the Chief Wahoo trademark, it would
have to be proven that the Chief Wahoo mark was either disparaging or
scandalous to Native Americans at the time the mark was registered. The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") established a test for determining
whether a mark was "disparaging" in Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc.121 In
order to be found disparaging, a mark must (1) be reasonably understood to
refer to the plaintiff; and (2) be considered offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Guidance for implementing the
Greyhound disparaging test may come from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's ("Federal Circuit") decision in In re Mavety Media Group
Ltd.,122 which interpreted section 1052(a)'s prohibition on the registration of
scandalous marks.
In Mavety, the court vacated and remanded a decision by the TTAB on the
grounds that the Board did not have actual evidence that a substantial
composite of the general public would find the mark "Black Tail," as applied to
an adult magazine featuring African-American women, scandalous.123 Mavety
is the Federal Circuit's first decision regarding 15 U.S. C.§ 1052(a).l24 InMavety,
the Federal Circuit concluded that a determination that a mark is scandalous

119§ 85(a) (1905).

120[n re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481,486 (C. C.P.A. 1981); see also Lee v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (1992) (court denied petition for name change to "Misteri Nigger"
because it refused to sanction a racial epithet).
1216 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding that a substantial composite of the
general public would find a mark which depicts a defecating dog scandalous).

122[n re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
123Jd. at 1375.
124In Mavety, the Federal Circuit dealt with an appeal of a refusal to register a mark
based on the grounds that the mark was scandalous, not disparaging, but its analysis
may still be helpful for implementing the Greyhound disparaging test. Id.
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is a conclusion of law based upon an underlying factual inquiry, and whether
the mark is scandalous is to be determined from the viewpoint of a substantial
composite of the general public and in the context of contemporary
attitudes)25 The Mavety court accepted dictionary definitions and editorials as
authoritative but not definitive, since the court concluded that dictionaries do
not necessarily represent the views of a substantial composite of the general
public.126 The Federal Circuit concluded that questions as to whether a mark
is scandalous should be resolved in favor of the applicant because an
opposition proceeding can be brought after the mark is published by those who
find the mark to be scandalous, and thereby a greater record for determining
whether the mark truly is scandalous will be established.127
Under Greyhound and Mavety, a challenge to the Chief Wahoo mark will have
to show that Chief Wahoo can be reasonably understood to depict Native
Americans and that the Chief Wahoo visage is offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Since a challenge to the Chief
Wahoo mark would be an opposition proceeding and not an ex parte
determination, the Chief Wahoo mark would not enjoy the presumptions in
favor of registration discussed by Mavety.
Following Mavety, in a challenge to the Chief Wahoo mark, the TIAB should
determine whether Chief Wahoo was disparaging to Native Americans from
the viewpoint of a substantial composite of the general public and in the context
of the contemporary attitudes at the time the mark was registered.
Unfortunately, even with the guidelines of Greyhound and Mavety, the outcome
of the registration challenge is highly speculative. Past decisions indicate that
determinations regarding disparagement are unpredictable and seemingly
subjective. The first case to refuse trademark registration on the grounds that
the mark was disparaging is Doughboy Industries, Inc. v. Reese Chern. Co.12B. In
Doughboy, the PTO held that the use of the mark "Dough-Boy" for a prophylactic
device for preventing venereal disease was disparaging to American veterans
who had served in World War I, and had been referred to as doughboys.129 The
PTO in Doughboy focused on the product to which the mark was being
applied.130 The TIAB likewise focused on the product to which the mark was
being applied in In re Reemtsma Cigarettenbabriken)3l In Reemtsma, the TIAB
denied registration to the mark "Senussi" for cigarettes, because it found that
the application of such mark disparaged members of the Senussi faith, whose

125 Id. at 1371.
l26Jd. at 1373.
l27Jd.
128Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chern. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 227 (P.T.O. 1951).

l29Jd.
l30Jd. at 228.
l3lJn re Reemtsma Cigarettenbabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
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religion forbids smoking.l32 Doughboy and Reemtsma are not dispositive to a
challenge to the Chief Wahoo emblem. In Doughboy and Reemtsma registration
was denied. The products the marks were being applied to, however, were
arguably more offensive than a baseball team emblem.
In In re Condas,133 the TTAB permitted the registration of the mark "Jap" for
women's clothing, finding that the use of such mark did not disparage
Japanese. Again, this case is not dispositive. In Condas the mark was given
registration. Arguably, the negative associations in Condas are not comparable
to the negative characteristics that the Chief Wahoo mark associates with
Native Americans.
In In reIn Over Our Heads, Inc.,l34 the Board found the mark "MOONIES" did
not disparage members of the Unification Church, because it would not be
associated with members of the Unification Church as applied to a partic~.l1ar
product.135 The Cleveland Indians may argue that, likewise, the Chief Wahoo
mark does not disparage Native Americans, because it is not associated with
Native Americans as applied to a baseball team. A challenger to the Chief
Wahoo mark may respond, however, that the mark "MOONIES" is much less
likely to be associated with members of the Unification Church when the mark
is applied to a novelty item than is the Chief Wahoo mark to be associated with
Native Americans when the mark is applied to a baseball team. While the
direction of past decisions regarding disparagement challenges under 1052(a)
is unclear, those offended by the Chief Wahoo emblem may be able to take
comfort in the August 1995 decision by the PTO which refused to register the
mark "Crazy Horse," a famous Native American, as applied to a malt liquor,
after finding that it violated Section 1052(a).l36
2. Standard and Case Law for "Scandalous"
The TTAB may also make a determination as to whether the Chief Wahoo
mark is "scandalous." The general definition that has been accepted for
"scandalous" is "shocking to one's sense of decency or propriety" and "offensive
to the conscience or moral feeling."137

132See also In re Waugh tel, 138 U.S.P.Q. 594 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (holding mark "Amish" for
cigars did not disparage the Amish, because Amish are not prohibited from smoking).

133In re Condas, 188 U.S.P.Q. 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
134In reIn Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
135Id.
136Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27
CONN. L. REv. 1003, 1028-29 (1995).

137In Re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals ("CCPA") found that the mark "Madonna" was scandalous as applied
to wines); see also In re P.J. Valckenberg, 122 U.S.P.Q. 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (twenty years
later mark was again denied registration because it was scandalous). But see Federal
Trademark Registration Number 1,473,554 (1988) (Board allowed registration of
"Madonna" as stage name for pop singer).
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To determine whether a mark is scandalous, the mark is considered as
applied to the goods identified in the registration.l38 In In re McGinley,l39 the
CCPA held that whether a mark is scandalous or immoral is to be ascertained
from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the general public.l40 Based
on such case law, to assess whether the Chief Wahoo mark is scandalous, the
TTAB will need to determine if the Chief Wahoo emblem, as applied to a
baseball team, is shocking to a substantial composite of the general public's
sense of decency or propriety and offensive to a substantial composite of the
general public's conscience or moral feeling.

C. Evidence that Chief Wahoo Refers to Native Americans and is Disparaging

and Scandalous
To sustain a 1052(a) challenge it will need to be shown that Chief Wahoo is
a disparaging or scandalous reference to Native Americans. There is no
question that the Chief Wahoo image refers to Native Americans. While the
Cleveland Indians argue that the Chief Wahoo emblem is not intended to refer
to an actual person or persons, even the team would have to admit the emblem
refers to Native Americans.141 The mark is obviously and facially a caricature
of stereotypes associated with Native Americans. Further, the fact that it is an
emblem for a team named for the first Native American to play professional

138 In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (f.T.A.B. 1988) (Board found "Big Peeker" was not
scandalous mark because substantial composite of general public would not necessarily
associate the term with a penis instead of a bird's beak).

l39In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
140Photograph of nude man and woman kissing with man's genitalia exposed is
scandalous and immoral from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the general
public. See In reIn Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (TTAB found
mark "MOONIES" not scandalous as applied to novelty item which dropped its pants
and revealed its buttocks); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (use
of the mark "bullshit'' for accessories was scandalous); In re Leo Quan Inc.,200 U.S.P.Q.
370,371 (T.T.A.B.1978) ("Badass,"standingfor, BenticourtAcoustically Designed Audio
Sound Systems, is not scandalous or immoral); In re Thomas Labs, Inc, 189 U.S.P.Q. 50,
52 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (cartoon of melancholy man examining his unseen genitalia was not
shocking to society's sense of propriety); Old Glory, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1219 (American flag
design on condoms is not scandalous); In re Masden, 180 U.S.P.Q. 334, 335 (T.T.A.B.
1973) ("Week-End Sex" is not scandalous trademark for a magazine); In re Runsdorf, 171
U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) ("Bubby Trap" denied registration as applied to brassieres);
Ex parte Summit Brass & Bronze Works, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. 22 (Comr. 1943) (PTO refused
registration for mark "Agnus Dei" as applied to safes, finding that such application of
an emblem sacred to Christian faith would be offensive and scandalous); Ex parte Martha
Maid Mfg., 37 U.S.P.Q. 156 (1938) (mark "Queen Mary" for women's underwear was
denied registration because it was found to be scandalous).
141Gary Axlerod, Controversy Over Chief Wahoo Continues, BLACK & GoLD (updated
January 25, 1996) <http:/ /tiger.chuh.cleveland-heights.k12.oh.us/Black Gold/81-04/
controversy-over-chief-w .html>.
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baseball supports the contention that the mark refers to Native Americans.142
Many Native Americans believe that Native American team names and
mascots, such as Cleveland's, are used not to honor Native American bravery
but to portray Native Americans as a spectacle to be ridiculed.l43 Native
American team names and mascots have been viewed by Native Americans as
a source of parody and satire and as a preservation of stereotypes. Furthermore,
many Native American feel that as a result of offensive mascots such as Chief
Wahoo, Native Americans experience discrimination and are ignored when
they attempt to call attention to greater social problems including poverty,
alcoholism, and suicide.144 In addition, many Native Americans believe that
Chief Wahoo and other derisive Native American mascots belittle history and
traditions and thereby challenge Native American self-esteem and pride in
their cultural identities.145
D. Evidence that Chief Wahoo is not Disparaging or Scandalous

The Cleveland Indians will be able to argue that the significant support
teams with Native American names have received from the Native American
community itself shows that the Chief Wahoo mark is not disparaging or
scandalous but rather pays tribute to Native Americans, and reflects bravery,
courage, pride and a fighting spirit. For example, the chief of the Cherokee tribe
in North Carolina has stated that the Redskins name does not bother his tribe,
and feels the name gives Native Americans recognition.146 Indeed, a Cherokee
princess, Pale Moon, even sang the National Anthem before a 1991 Redskins
game.147 The tribe also has high regard for the Atlanta Braves, and
manufactures fake tomahawks for Braves' fans.148
Examples of Native American support for other teams with Native American
names include the statement of James Billie, chairman of the Seminole Tribe of
Florida, who asserts that Florida State's use of the Seminole name for its team
reflects a pride in Florida Seminole history and is an ego boost to his tribe.l49

142Cleveland Indians Web Page (visited June 17, 1998) <http:/ /www.indians.com/
history /index.html>.

143Chief Wahoo is Likely on Extinction Path, THE

VICTORIA SUN PRESS ENTERPRISE,

Oct.

21, 1997, at COl.

144Daniel J. Trainor, Native American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile
Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 971, 971-72 (1995).

145Jd. at 975.
1460ffensive Penalty is Called on "Redskins"; Native American Tribes Protest the Name,
Nov. 3, 1991, at Dl.

WASHINGTON POST,

147Jd.
148Jd.
149Jack Wheat, Real Seminoles Resent the Profits FSU Makes OffTheir Tribal Name, MIAMI
Feb. 11, 1993, at 7B.

HERALD,
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Another example is the Illinois Indians who have come out in support of the
University of Illinois football team and its use of Native American imagery. ISO
Perhaps the strongest argument that Native American names and images are
not intended to be derogatory but rather are intended to be symbolic of strength
and bravery is the very fact that teams have chosen to use such names.
Arguably, a team's name is chosen to encourage and serve as a rallying point,
not to demean the players. This of course does not mean that it is not offensive
to members of a group that do not want that group to be popularly associated
with violence and savagery. Furthermore, it is hard to extend this argument to
the Chief Wahoo emblem which is clearly a caricature and a parody.

E. Challenge to the Redskins Trademark
A current challenge to the Redskins' federal trademark registration may be
seen as a bell-weather for the likelihood of success a similar challenge would
have to the Chief Wahoo mark. On September 10, 1992, a delegation of Native
Americans (hereinafter, referred to alternatively as the "delegation," "Harjo," or
the "Harjo Delegation") filed a Petition for Cancellation with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") to cancel the federal registration of the
Washington Redskins trademark, and related trademarks,l51 Pro-Football, Inc.
(hereafter "Pro Football" or "Redskins") is the owner of the trademarks being
challenged. The delegation represented a wide spectrum of the Native
American community,152 The petition alleged that the term "Redskins" is a
"pejorative, derogatory, degrading, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous,
disreputable, disparaging and racist designation for a Native American
person" and therefore violated 15 U.S.C. section 1052(a),l53 The suit reflects the
concern of Native American activists that Indian-related names, logos,
mascots, paraphernalia, and related fan activity perpetuate racist stereotypes
of Native Americans as wild savages, and preserve the image that Native

150Jim Parsons, Indians Say Fight Over Nicknames Isn't Going Away, MINNEAPOliS-ST.
PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 1995, at 1A.
151Related trademarks which the petition seeks to cancel include: "Redskinettes,"
"Skins," "Redskins," "The Redskins & Design," "Washington Redskins & Design," and
"The Redskins with Stylized Letters." Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828
(T.T.A.B. 1994).
152The members of the delegation include Suzan Shown Harjo, the President of the
Morning Star Foundation; Vine Deloria, Jr., Esq., a citizen of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe and professor of history at the University of Colorado; Norbert S. Hill, Jr., Esq., a
member of the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin and Executive Director of the American
Indian Science and Engineering Society; Manley A. Begay, Jr., of the Navajo Nation;
Mateo Romero, member of the Cochiti Pueblo; William A. Means, a member of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe; and Raymond D. Apodaca, Governor of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,
and Area Vice President and Chairman of the Human and Religious Rights Committee
of the National Congress of American Indians. A Case of First Impression: American
Indians Seek Cancellation ofthe Trademarked Term "Redskins," 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Socy 275 (Apr. 1996).
153Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1829.
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Americans are relics of the past.l54 Such concern also applies to the Cleveland
Indians' Chief Wahoo mascot.155
Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc. is the first cancellation proceeding ever brought
under the "disparagement" prohibition of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.156
The TTAB found that the Native American delegation had standing because
they had demonstrated that they believed the term was disparaging as applied
to Native Americans .I 57 The TTAB also found that an overriding public interest
trumped the failure to challenge the mark over the many years since its
registration.158 The TTAB concluded that since it is an administrative agency
empowered by Congress, it does not have the authority to determine if 15
U.S.C. section 1052(a) is unconstitutional as a government infringement on
speech.159 Such constitutional defenses, however, can be raised on appeal)60

154Don Pierson, Redskins Nickname Will Be Protest Target, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 19,
1992, at C2.
155 Activism related to the issue of Native American mascots and names has been
ongoing for approximately twenty-four years. Clarence Page, Block that Trademarked
Racial Epithet, ORLANOO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 1992, at A9. Prior to the recent trademark
action two of the most notable Native American protests to team names occurred during
the 1992 Super Bowl featuring the Redskins and the 1991 World Series featuring the
Atlanta Braves. Protests organized by the American Indian Movement ("AIM") drew
nearly three thousand activists to the Super Bowl. Raad Cawthorn, Baseball Indians
Receive Little Sympathy But No Promises, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 22, 1991 at H8;
NFL Deadline for Plan B Slips to Mar.l, NFLPA Says Move is Political, WASHINGTON POST,
Jan. 25, 1992, at D7.

156Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1828.
157Jd. at 1830.
158Id. at 1831.
159Id. For further discussion of the constitutionality of section 1052(a) and limiting
speech, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Outsiders in American Law and Culture:
Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills? 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1992 ); see also
Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why "Immoral" and "Scandalous" Trademarks
Should be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 191 (1996); Kimberly A. Pace, The
Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must
a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 7 (1994). Both articles argue that section 1052(a)
unconstitutionally encroaches on free speech. See also Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819
F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (legislation prohibiting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, from certifying label that uses the name "Crazy Horse" on alcohol found to be
unconstitutional prohibition on commercial speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414
(1989) (bedrock principle underlying First Amendment is that government cannot
prohibit expression of idea simply because society finds idea offensive or disagreeable);
Samba's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(restricting use of term "Samba's" would violate First Amendment). But see Bruce C.
Kelber, Scalping the Redskins: Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native
American Nicknames and Images on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 533
(1994); Paul E. Loving, Native American Team Names in Athletics: It's Time to Trade These
Marks, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1 (1992). Both articles conclude that section 1052(a) is a
constitutional and effective tool to advance social goals. See also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d
481, 484 (C. C.P.A. 1981) (1052(a) not unconstitutional restriction on free speech because
registration is not determinate of usage rights).
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Pro Football asserts that through long, substantial and widespread use, the
Redskins mark has acquired a secondary meaning such that the term is
associated with a professional football team, rather than with Native
Americans.161 The TTAB has indicated, however, that the case will be
determined by deciding whether, at the time the registration was issued, the
mark was scandalous or disparaging.l62 Because a federally registered
trademark has a presumption of validity, Harjo will have the burden of proving
disparagement as the case moves forward.l63 Many of the issues raised by the
challenge to the Redskins trademark would apply equally to a challenge

Because a trademark is only commercial speech, trademark legislation is subjected
to relaxed constitutional requirements. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
Government regulation of commercial speech must serve a substantial purpose, and not
be broader than is necessary to serve such purpose. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see also Caren Schmulen
Sweetland, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending
First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEX L. REv. 2 (1997);
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 287
(1990); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 79 TRADEMARK
REP. 604 (1989).
Regardless of whether section 1052(a) is constitutional, it presents serious
efficiency problems. What is, or is not, an offensive term is a question open to significant
difference of opinion, and may force the Patent and Trademark Office and courts to
make determinations which are beyond the proper scope of trademark protection and
which may not be purely objective. The value of a trademark is in the goodwill that
accrues to the mark, and the associations consumers make with the mark. The
marketplace might be a more objective arbiter of what is and is not an offensive mark.
160 A party dissatisfied with a decision by the PTO has the option either to appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or to appeal through a civil action in federal
district court. The appeal is governed by section 21 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1071.
On appeal, a district court provides greater relief, and gives less weight to the fact
findings of the PTO, than does the Federal Circuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071. An appeal that
takes the form of a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with a district
court, and is governed by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint
indicates the unsuccessful party in the PTO as the plaintiff and the winning party as the
defendant and bases federal jurisdiction on section 21(b) of the Lanham Act and 15
U.S.C. § 1071. An appeal to a district court can be expanded to include a prayer for
injunctive relief for trademark infringement. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach
Properties, Inc., 685 F.2d 302 (9th Cir 1982); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out, 481 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1973). It also allows for counterclaims for federal or commonlaw claims.
Johnson & Johnson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 345 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1972). Thus, in
going to a federal district court, rather than to the Federal Circuit, the appellant takes
the risk that the adverse party will expand the scope of the litigation beyond the mere
appeal from the TTAB's decision.
161Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (1994). This is different from the
typical secondary meaning defense which argues that the average consumer associates
a trademark with a particular source for the product. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DoCTRINES (1993).

162Harjo, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1828.
163Jd.
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against the Chief Wahoo trademark. The disposition of the challenge to the
Redskins trademark will therefore be highly indicative of the likelihood of
success a challenge to the Chief Wahoo mark would have.
V. CONCLUSION

The Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo emblem is seen by many as disparaging
to the Native American community and as a discriminatory emblem which
parodies and denigrates Native Americans and their culture. This article has
discussed two methods by which the Chief Wahoo emblem may be legally
challenged. The first method requires a finding that the use of the Chief Wahoo
emblem by the Cleveland Indians in Jacobs Field may be attributed to the City
of Cleveland because of the significant involvement the city has in the financing
and regulation of the team. If use of the Chief Wahoo emblem can be viewed
as government action, such use is subject to a challenge as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or as racist speech and
as such a violation, under a novel theory, of the First Amendment.
This first challenge faces some very significant hurdles. Even if it could be
successfully argued that regardless of the fact that the Indians are privately
owned, the teams' actions in Jacobs Field may be deemed state actions, it would
still have to be shown that there was sufficient discriminatory intent behind
the creation of Chief Wahoo such that the emblem is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Alternatively, in addition to proving that the teams' actions
should be deemed state actions, a new theory asserting that discriminatory
state speech is a violation of the First Amendment would have to be accepted.
A second method of challenging the Chief Wahoo emblem, by asserting it is
a disparaging trademark and therefore invalidly registered, may face less
obstacles. In order to successfully assert that the Chief Wahoo emblem should
not enjoy federal trademark registration protection, it must be shown that the
mark is either scandalous or disparaging as the courts have interpreted such
terms under section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act. While a similar challenge to
the Redskins trademark has not yet been resolved, the implications of such
challenge may be instructive as to the success of challenging Chief Wahoo's
registration rights.
While many see the Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo emblem as
non-offensive, many others find it a form of minority derision. Given the
obviousness of the reference and the fact that many Native Americans find it
highly offensive, hopefully the Cleveland Indians will change the mark
themselves. If not, the action contemplated in this article might provide valid
grounds for viable legal challenges.
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